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A commentary on
Merging of long-termmemories in an insect
by Hunt, K.L., and Chittka, L. (2015). Curr. Biol. 25, 741–745. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.01.023
Imagine that you are asked to remember a list of words (e.g., “inside” and “consult”). At test
you have to recognize which words were in the list. Now imagine that one of the words that
you have to recognize is “insult.” Was “insult” in the list? If you respond “yes,” you are making
a conjunction error (Underwood and Zimmerman, 1973; Reinitz et al., 1992; Kroll et al., 1996);
that is, you incorrectly recognize a novel word (insult), which is made up of parts of two previously
studied items (“in,” “sult”), as being part of the previously studied word list. This example illustrates
that human episodic memory (memory for events, such as the event of learning a word list) is
reconstructive and not an accurate representation of previously experienced events (Roediger,
1996; Tulving, 2005). When recalling an event, we often rely on our store of general knowledge to
fill in the gaps, or we confuse information from different sources (Schacter, 2001). Thus, errors (e.g.,
conjunction errors) constitute the main evidence for reconstructive processes in remembering.
Understanding episodic memory as an evolved capacity implies investigating other animals besides
humans. Over the last two decades comparative psychologists have mainly studied whether non-
human animals (henceforth animals) accurately remember what happened, where and when
[Clayton and Dickinson, 1998; see Zentall et al. (2008) and Fortin et al. (2004) for other empirical
approaches]. However, the reconstructive nature of episodic memory in animals has received much
less attention, although some studies have addressed false memories in animals. For example,
artificial memories have been induced by targeted neuronal activation in genetically engineered
mice (Liu et al., 2012) and flies (Claridge-Chang et al., 2009); and brain damaged rats behave toward
novel objects as if they were familiar (McTighe et al., 2010). However, no research has investigated
the reconstructive nature of memory in intact animals, which is crucial to understand the normal
functioning of their memory systems.
In a recent study published in Current Biology, Hunt and Chittka (2015) did just that: in a
series of experiments they investigated whether bees make memory conjunction errors. For the
purpose of our argument we will focus on the last experiment, which we consider to be the most
convincing one. Authors trained bees to first find a reward (sugar solution) in artificial flowers with
a black and white (b/w) pattern (a ring in one group, a grid in another group). Next bees from
both groups were rewarded on plain blue flowers but not in the previously rewarded b/w ones. At
test 24 h later, bees were presented with the two types of artificial flowers previously experienced
and two new types: blue rings and blue grids. Note that whereas for one group the blue grid was
the conjunction stimulus and the blue ring only shared one feature with the previously experienced
stimuli (i.e., feature stimulus), for the other group the opposite was true. Bees preferred searching
in blue flowers. However, they quickly developed a preference for the corresponding conjunction
stimulus (e.g., blue ring) over the b/w and the feature stimuli (e.g., blue grid). This design illustrates
that bees merge features of previously experienced flowers and rules out simple generalization, as
an explanation for bees’ responses.
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But is this preference for the conjunction stimuli in the second
half of the experiment evidence for a memory conjunction
error? The outcome is different from typical memory conjunction
errors in humans. Firstly, humans make memory conjunction
errors after short retention intervals, while the bees did not
(first experiment; not described above) (e.g., Reinitz et al., 1996;
Jones et al., 2007). Secondly, independent of the materials used,
humans consistently identify conjunction (new items created by
combining features of two previously studied items) and feature
(new items created by combining a new feature and a feature
of a previously studied item) items as being “old” items more
often than they do with totally new items, but less often than
they do for actual target (i.e., old) items (Jones and Jacoby, 2001).
An explanation based on familiarity accounts for such findings
(e.g., Jones et al., 2007). Note that bees were not presented with
a new item (i.e., stimuli integrated by two novel features) in any
of the experiments, and they preferred the conjunction stimulus
(e.g., blue ring pattern for those subjects who experienced “ring”
in the first part of the training) to feature (e.g., blue grid) and
original stimuli (i.e., b/w ring pattern)—as mentioned above this
preference only emerged during the second half of the test.
We think that the training procedure might have caused
these differences. During the differential reinforcement phase
bees learned which flowers contained reward and also which
ones did not. However, the change (increase) in associative
strength of the positively-reinforced flowers will be greater
than the change (decrease) in associative strength in the non-
reinforced flowers, because the bees visit more rewarded flowers
than non-rewarded flowers (training data in Supplementary
Materials). Therefore, after the reversal learning, there is still
some positive association left with the firstly-trained flowers,
albeit less than with the last-trained flowers (see Menzel, 1969).
If we then assume that the associative strength is distributed
between the two features of each flower (pattern: ring vs.
disk; and color: black vs. blue), then the conjunction stimulus
should have an associative strength somewhere between the
two original stimuli. With the right combination of associative
strengths assigned to the different features (which may have
different salience), the results should come out as observed,
with a preference for the last-rewarded type (blue), followed
by the conjunction stimulus, and an initial avoidance of the
feature stimulus and the last-non-rewarded type. A loss of
associative strength over time (especially if that drop is steeper
for the most recently-rewarded features) would explain why
the pattern only arose after 24 h, but not on immediate
testing.
Does the fact that we can explain Hunt and Chittka’s (2015)
results using associative learning mean that bees do not make
memory conjunction errors? Not necessarily. There is no a
priori reason to prefer an associative learning explanation to a
more cognitive one. Both the associative learning and familiarity
accounts, for example, would predict that training the bees such
that both stimuli were rewarded simultaneously (or interleaved)
should result in preference for both target stimuli, but might
result in preference of conjunctive stimuli over feature stimuli and
new stimuli. Finding conditions that distinguish between the two
explanations might be difficult, as both could be true at the same
time but at different levels of analysis.
Whether or not humans and bees retrieve features in the
same manner or not, the approach of looking for similarities
between the memory systems of humans and other animals
by investigating “false memories” is an exciting one. We look
forward to a new crop of papers exploiting this novel direction
in comparative cognition.
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